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THE CONFESSION CONFUSION
Editor's Note: Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966) was decided during the process of
publication of this article and therefore should be consulted for the most recent develop-
ment of the law in this area.
ROBERT W. MILLER AND MARK KESSEL*
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
which overruled and changed well settled law ... have created
new and difficult legal and police problems, and have imposed
new Constitutional restrictions on the solution of crime and the
conviction of criminals. Especially when retroactively applied
by the mandates of the Supreme Court, they seriously endanger
the safety and welfare of all law-abiding citizens.1
Certainly the decisions of the Supreme Court have created considerable
confusion for judges, prosecuting officials and law enforcement officers
in many areas of criminal law, not the least of which is the law with
regard to confessions. While the short view is that a great deal of
confusion has been created, Dean Erwin N. Griswold believes that the
"long view" will indicate a welcome progress in the administration of
criminal justice.2 Indeed, one jurist credits these decisions with bringing
about "The Emergence of the Criminal Law." 3 ,
Confessions are important to those engaged in law enforcement.
They often expedite the search for evidence and remove lingering
doubts. Prosecutors welcome a plea of guilty in that time and expense
of a trial are saved. In many instances a confession may motivate a
defendant to make, and a prosecutor to accept, a plea to a lesser offense.
The minds of jurors are eased with the admission of a confession into
a case in which they are judging the guilt or innocence of a fellow man.
Treatises on evidence indicate that since it is against a person's in-
terest to confess, a valid confession is the highest kind of evidence.
4
However, a confession, in and of itself, is not sufficient to warrant
conviction without some additional proof that the crime charged has
been committed.5
COERCED CONFESSIONS
Whether one determines the voluntariness of a confession by simply
inquiring "whether a defendant's will was overborne at the time he
confessed, 'e or by a "three-phased process,"'7 an examination of a
* Robert W. Miller is Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College of
Law. Mark Kessel is a contributor to and Managing Editor of the Syracuse
Law Review. B.A. 1963, City College of the City University of New York.
1 Commonwealth v. Myers, 213 A. 2d 613, 626 (Pa. 1965).
2 Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965).
3 Ainsworth, The Emergence of the Criminal Law, STUDENT LAW. J., Oct. 1965.
p. 21.
4 See e.g. 3 "W.IGmORE, EVIDENCE §866 (3d ed. 1940); see also McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 348 (1943) (dissenting opinion.)
5 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2070-72 (3d ed. 1940). Some states have enacted this
requirement into law, e.g., N.Y. CODE Cant. PRoc.. §395.
6 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961).
7 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961):
The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was voluntarily
or involuntarily made involves, at the least, a three-phased process. First,
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state of mind is required. 8 Therefore, the voluntariness of a confession
when in issue before the Supreme Court is a question of fact to be
independently determined by it:
Where the claim is that the prisoner's statement has been
procured by such means [i.e., coercion], we are bound to make
an independent examination of the record to determine the
validity of the claim. The performance of this duty cannot be
foreclosed by a finding of a court, or the verdict of a jury,
or both.9
The decision as to whether or not particular conduct of law enforce-
ment agencies constitutes coercion is judged by "the totality of cir-
cumstances" 10 which is dependent upon two main factors: (1) The
personal characteristics of the individual confessing, and (2) the
pressures to which the individual was subjected to induce the con-
fession.11 Although the Supreme Court, by taking cognizance of the
race,12 age, 13 prior experience with police'14 level of intelligence," and
amount of education"6 of the person confessing, has been concerned
with the first factor, nevertheless, it is said that the Court has stressed
there is the business of finding the crude historical facts, the external,
"phenomenological" occurrences and events surrounding the confession.
Second, because the concept of "voluntariness" is one which concerns a
mental state, there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of
internal, "psychological" fact. Third, there is the application to this psy-
chological fact of standards for judgment informed by the larger con-
ceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which, also, com-
prehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances.
8 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963) : "If an individual's 'will was
overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect and
a free will,' his confession is inadmissible because coerced."
9 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237-38 (1941) ; see also Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945): "[T]he question whether there has been a
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the in-
troduction of an involuntary confession is one on which we must make an
independent determination on the undisputed facts."
IOThe test formulated in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), is whether
"the totality of the circumstances that preceded the confessions . . .goes be-
yond the allowable limits." Id. at 197.
11 See Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confessions Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 39-43 (1962).
12 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) ; Thomas v. Arizona, 356
U.S. 390 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) ; Gallegos v. Nebra-
ska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) ; Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948) ; Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
14 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963) ; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) ; Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
15 See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961) ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
26 See Crocker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.




the nature of the methods employed by the law enforcement officials
at the time the confession was extracted. 17
In 1936 the Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi' held that a
conviction based solely on confessions obtained by physical torture was
"void for want of the essential elements of due process."'19 The same
decision was reached four years later as to convictions founded upon
confessions extracted by psychological coercion. 20 The Court has held
confessions to be involuntary in cases where the defendant was subjected
to protracted periods of questioning,21 deprived of sleep," held incom-
municado for a long period,'23 or threatened that he would not be pro-
tected from mob violence unless he told the truth.24 In White v. Texas,
a confession was deemed involuntary when it was shown that the
suspect was taken to a wooded area during the night and interrogated."
Where a petitioner confessed after being arrested, taken to a hotel
room, stripped and not allowed to put on his garments for several hours,
the Court ruled that reference to this confession in summation by the
prosecutor constituted a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights. 26 According to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, "un-
orthodox" procedures (i.e., a lie detector test and interrogation after
sodium pentothal injections) do not automatically render a subsequent
confession involuntary.' 7
Other less violent factors bearing on the question of voluntariness
include: unlawful arrest,'2 delay in arraignment, 9 request by the de-
fendant for counsel,30 and failure to apprise the accused of his right
'1 Ritz, supra note 11, at 42-43.
is 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19 Id. at 287.
20 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 307 (1963).
"1Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S.
68 (1949) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944).22Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219(1941) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
"3Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191(1957) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949).
24 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
25 310 U.S. 530 (1940).26Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
27 Thompson v. Cox, 352 F. 2d 488 (10th Cir. 1965).
s See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
see also text and at accompanying notes 123-136 infra.
29See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433(1958); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). See text at and accompanying notes 111-122 infra.3OPrior to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), some cases indicated that
the defendant's request for counsel or a request by counsel to confer with
the defendant was one such important factor: Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Culombe v.
19661
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to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. 31
Since the issue in these cases-"Is the confession the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker ?"32-involves
a question of fact,33 the courts continue to examine the propriety of
police conduct in making determinations as to voluntariness.
In Haynes v. Washington,34 decided by the Supreme Court in 1963,
a written confession was admitted into evidence which was obtained
after the defendant was held incommunicado for sixteen hours and
had been told by the police that he would not be permitted to call his
wife until such time as he had signed the confession. The confession
was held involuntary. 35 In the same year the Court labelled a confession
"coerced" that was obtained by threats that if the defendant did not
cooperate with the police, the state would deprive her of financial as-
sistance for her children and they might be permanently taken from
her. 36 In Townsend v. Sain, 37 a narcotic addict had been administered
a drug which had the effect of a "truth serum." The Court stated:
If an individual's "will was overborne" or if his confession
was not "the product of a rational intellect and a free will," his
confession is inadmissible because coerced. These standards are
applicable whether a confession is the product of physical in-
timidation or psychological pressure and, of course, are equally
applicable to a drug-induced statement.'8
Similar standards had been applied to a unique case 39 where police
officers brought a person to a hospital and an emetic was forced into
his stomach against his will. He regurgitated two capsules which con-
tained a narcotic. "To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers
call 'real evidence' from verbal evidence," the Court stated, "is to
ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions.
40
Even if the independent findings of fact as to voluntariness can be
predicted with any degree of certainty, the rationale behind these
cases is not always as certain. For example, when the Brown decision
was reached, the Supreme Court's reason for excluding a coerced con-
fession was based on the argument that such confessions are untrust-
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) ;
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945).
31 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See text at and accompanying
notes 59-63 infra.
32 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
33 See text at and accompanying note 9 supra.
34373 U.S. 503 (1963).
35 Ibid.
a6 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
37372 U.S. 293 (1963).
38 Id. at 307.
-9 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
40 d. at 173.
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worthy as evidence.41 Subsequently, the Court reasoned that the ad-
mission into evidence of a coerced confession would result in a violation
of fair trial conduct.42 Also advocated by the Court has been the propo-
sition that adversaries should be equal, i.e., equality should exist be-
tween the interrogator and the suspect.4 3 Lastly, in often-cited language,
the Supreme Court stated that "protracted, systematic and uncontrolled
subjection of an accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose
of eliciting . . . confessions is subversive of the accusatorial system....
[T]he Due Process Clause bars police procedure which violates the
basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime. . .. ""
As some of the more recent cases indicate, what theory the Court
will rely on is not always certain. In Spano v. New York,4 5 for example,
the Court's decision utilized the evidence and the due process theories.'
In Rogers v. Richmond,4 7 which arose two years after Spano, reliance
was placed on the due process theory.48 However, almost immediately,
the Supreme Court reverted to the evidence theory.
4 9
While in prior cases the Supreme Court had intimated that the
privilege against self-incrimination was an underlying reason for ex-
cluding a confession, no decision was founded upon this theory until
the 1964 ruling in Malloy v. Hogan.'3
Perhaps the greatest consequences and confusion will arise from
the decisions excluding confessions on the theory that they were ob-
tained in violation of an accused's constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel. An immedate conflict of opinion stems from the fact that
by this rule confessions can be excluded which are wholly voluntary.5 '
To complete the circuitry of confusion, it must be pointed out that
while the absence of counsel can exclude voluntary statements, it
appears that it may also be a factor in determining the voluntariness
of a confession. The request to contact one's parents may be equivalent
to asking for an attorney52 or it may apply solely to the question of
41297 U.S. at 286. See also 3 XIG oRE, EViDENCE §822, at 246 (3d ed. 1940).
42Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941).
43 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). Cf. Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958). Under this theory, the right to counsel is becoming
determinative. See text at and accompanying 54-97 infra.
4 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).
45360 U.S. 315 (1959).
4d. at 320-21.
47365 U.S. 534 (1961).
-s Id. at 540-41.
'0 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961).
50378 U.S. 1 (1964).
5' See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (dissenting opinion) and
text at and accompanying notes 64-68 infra. See also People v. Friedlander,
16 N.Y. 2d 248, 212 N.E. 2d 533 (1965).
52 See People v. Taylor, 22 App. Div. 2d 524, 256 N.Y.S.. 944 (1st Dept. 1965).
This case was modified on appeal to the extent that, in New York at the
present time, a defendant's confession is "not made inadmissable solely be-
cause his family was refused access to him but that this fact would be
germane in the issue of its voluntary nature." 16 N.Y. 2d 1038, 1040, 213
1966]
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voluntariness. 53 Thus the distinction between involuntary confessions
and those obtained in the absence of counsel is not as clear cut as it
would appear on the surface.
CONFESSIONS AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although the right to counsel in federal prosecutions had been
recognized since 1938,54 it was not until the 1963 decision in Gideon v.
Wainwrigh 5 5 that the Supreme Court extended this right to state
prosecutions of felonies. Of the various questions that Gideon left
unanswered,56 one of those which at the present time is causing courts
and law enforcement agencies concern is "When does the right to
assistance of counsel commence ?"
In Massiah v. United States,57 the Supreme Court ruled that self-
incriminatory statements, deliberately elicited from the defendant by
federal agents after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel,
were inadmissible at his trial. Use of such evidence was a denial of
the defendant's right to due process.5
Approximately fifteen months after the Gideon decision the Supreme
Court decided Escobedo v'. Illinois.59 Escobedo was arrested and re-
moved to a police station where he was placed in "custody" although
not formally charged with a crime. Subsequently, his retained counsel
arrived and requested permission to consult with him. During the
course of the interrogation, despite repeated requests by both counsel
and Escobedo, they were denied the opportunity to consult with each
other. Testimony by the police disclosed that Escobedo was not advised
of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel. During the trial
Escobedo had moved to suppress the incriminating statements, but such
motions were denied. Although upon appeal the Supreme Court of
Illinois in its original opinion reversed the conviction of murder after
it determined that the statements made to the police were inadmissible,
on rehearing it affirmed.
6 0
N.E. 2d 321 (1965). Since the appellate division decided the case before the
Court of Appeals of New York handed down People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y. 2d
973, 207 N.E. 2d 529 (1965), it no longer appears that asking to contact one's
parents is equivalent in New York to asking for an attorney.
53 People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y. 2d 973, 207 N.E. 2d 529 (1965).
54Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (counsel must be appointed for in-
digent defendants unless intelligently waived).
55372 U.S. 335 (1963).
-6 Is Gideon to be given retroactive effect? What is the test of indigency? Does
Gideon apply to misdemeanor cases? (See People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y. 2d
392, 207 N.E. 2d 358 (1965), which held yes.) Does Gideon apply to prosecu-
tions for infractions and offenses?
57377 U.S. 201 (1964).
5s Id. at 206-07. This same result had been previously reached by the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y. 2d 561, 175 N.E. 2d 445
(1961).
59378 U.S. 478 (1964).
60 People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E. 2d 825 (1963).
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.6 ' In
a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general in-
quiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a par-
ticular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute con-
stitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment," Gideon v. Wainwright, . . . and that
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation
may be used against him at a criminal trial.62
The Court added: "Nothing we have said today affects the powers of
the police to investigate 'an unsolved crime' . . . by gathering informa-
tion from witnesses and by other 'proper investigation efforts.'"63
Although at first blush it might not be evident what the majority
had in mind when it reached its decision, Mr. Justice White shed some
illumination on the case when he stated: "The decision is thus another
major step in the direction of the goal which the Court seemingly has
in mind-to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an in-
dividual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not."6
While the reasons for excluding involuntary confessions run to the
very essence of a confession,65 the rationale for excluding statements
wholly voluntary is not that clear.66 Moreover, an exclusion of voluntary
confessions has enormous repercussions. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that when the Court excludes confessions
wholly voluntary, it "perverts those precious constitutional guarantees,
and frustrates the vital interests of society in preserving the legitimate
and proper function of honest and purposeful police investigation." '
The force of this argument is not felt until one realizes that approxi-
mately 75 percent of all convictions for serious crimes are founded upon
confessions presumably voluntary. 68
It should be noted that Escobedo involved retained counsel and that
a request by the petitioner to consult with his attorney was denied, as
was the attorney's request to confer with his client. Moreover, the
rationale of the Supreme Court was founded upon the fact that the
61 Escobedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 902 (1963).
62378 U.S. at 490-91.
631d. at 492.
641d. at 495.
65 See text at and accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
66 See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra. See also Mr. Justice White's com-
ments in Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 496-97.
67378 U.S. at 494.
68 TuIE, The Revolution in Criminal Justice, July 16, 1965, p. 22.
1%o6]
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right to counsel attaches at the "critical stage" of the criminal prosecu-
tion, and that the accusatory stage is "critical." 9 Therefore, there was
no reliance by the majority on the privilege against self-incrimination
in support of their position.
While some cases decided by state courts have turned on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination,7 0 since Escobedo arose under the four-
teenth amendment, it thereby compels the states to adopt the "critical
stage" standard in a determination as to the admissibility of incrimi-
nating statements. However, as to when the "critical stage" standard is
to be applied, and how far it is to be extended is not clear.
In People v. Sanchez,7 decided by the New York Court of Appeals,
defendant's attorney requested to consult with his client who was in
police custody. The defendant thereafter was interrogated and made
incriminating statements in the absence of counsel. The trial court
charged the jury that the fact that the lawyer was prevented from con-
ferring with his client is only relevant on the issue of voluntariness of
the defendant's statements. The Court of Appeals held that these state-
ments should have been excluded, "and it matters not, insofar as
application of the rule ... [in People v. Donovan,7 2 People v. Failla71
and People v. Gunner,74] is concerned, whether the defendant, when
taken into custody, was regarded by the police as 'accused,' 'suspect'
or 'witness.' ,,75 The court concluded:
The significant or operative fact in such cases is that the de-
fendant confessed or otherwise incriminated himself while be-
ing interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel after
he had requested the aid of an attorney or one retained to repre-
sent him had contacted the police in his behalf.
7 6
The concurring opinion would not have extended the court's ruling to
"a mere witness."17 Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals, in
its language, has gone beyond the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo.
It would appear that in New York, regardless of the status of the
person questioned, questioning someone after his request for counsel,
or after counsel has contacted the law enforcement agency, renders
subsequent statements inadmissible. But this rationale, as evidenced by
the court's language, is not strictly dependent upon the "no counsel"
rationale, but rather upon the privilege against self-incrimination
69 378 U.S. at 486.
7o See, e.g., People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y. 2d 226, 205 N.E. 2d 852 1965); People
v. Donovan, 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628 (1963).
7' 15 NY. 2d 387, 207 N.E. 2d 356 (1965).
7 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628 (1963).
73 14 N.Y. 2d 178, 199 N.E. 2d 366 (1964).
74 15 N.Y. 2d 266, 205 N.E. 2d 852 (1965).
75 15 N.Y. 2d at 389, 207 N.E. 2d at 356.
76 Ibid.
77 15 N.Y. at 392, 207 N.E. 2d at 358.
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which, according to People v. Donovan,7 8 the attorney's function is to
protect.
The direction in which the cases dealing with confessions are going
is illustrated by a recent case, also decided by the New York Court of
Appeals. After a lawyer consulted with a defendant, he told the police
officer to "arrest and arraign" her. Hours later, but prior to any arraign-
ment, the policeman questioned the defendant, and elicited incriminating
statements. While not indicating whether the request for arraignment
was a principal factor in its decision, the court in reversing the con-
viction stated:
The right to counsel is fundamental... and statements obtained
after arraignment not in the presence of counsel are inadmis-
sible ... as are statements where access has been denied and
this is so even when counsel cannot obtain access due to physical
circumstances, as in People v. Guniner. . . . So it is here. The
authorities, knowing the defendant was represented by counsel
who had requested them to "arrest and arraign" his client,
nonetheless, after counsel left, took occasion to elicit damaging
admissions from her.79
While it is true that New York previously held that statements
obtained after indictment were inadmissible where the defendant had
not obtained counsel,80 here no logical rationale appears. If there is
"'no counsel" or counsel is denied access to his client, it may be that
the defendant will not be apprised of his constitutional rights; but
where counsel has met with the defendant and presumably tells his
client not to make any statements, and the defendant later does make
statements without being coerced, then there is no reason why such
admissions should not be admitted into evidence.
Have we reached the point where courts will "bar from evidence
all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime whether
involuntarily made or not" ?81 Apparently not. Instead, the New York
Court of Appeals has offered a saving solution. While the police are
not required to advise the defendant of his right to counsel, they may
do so, and if, thereafter, the defendant voluntarily confesses, he may
waive his right and thereby render the confession admissible.8 2 Simul-
taneously, the court determined that the right to counsel attaches to
protect "post-information" statements as well as "post-indictment" state-
ments. It would seem that good police practice would now require that
all potential defendants be advised of their right to counsel and their
right to remain silent. More important, such practice would seem to
78 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628 (1963).
79 People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y. 2d 248, 250-251, 212 N.E. 2d 533, 534 (1965).
so See People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y. 2d 561, 175 N.E. 2d 445 (1961).
81 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1965).
82People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y. 2d 275, 213 N.E. 2d 411 (1965). Quaere: Can an in-




give full impetus to the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo, and
avoid future repercussions with respect to convictions obtained prior
to the Supreme Court's amplification of its decision. If the Supreme
Court should adopt the rule of People v. Dorado8 3 as opposed to People
v. Gunner,8 many new trials could result to overburden the prosecutors
and courts. A comparison of the cases delineates the divergence of
these two positions.
People v. Dorado,5 decided 4-to-3 by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, had a fact situation similar to that in Escobedo, with the ex-
ception that the defendant did not request, and was not denied, the
opportunity to confer with his lawyer. The court held:
[D]efendant's confession could not properly be introduced into
evidence because (1) the investigation was no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a
particular suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody, (3) the
authorities had carried out a process of interrogations that lent
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, (4) the authorities
had not effectively informed defendant of his right to counsel
or of his absolute right to remain silent, and no evidence es-
tablishes that he had waived these rights8s
California, therefore, would not demand, as a prerequisite to the ex-
clusion of a confession, a request for counsel. "The defendant who does
not ask for counsel," stated the court, "is the very defendant who most
needs counsel."87 The majority also stated that they could not "penalize
a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not
make a formal request and by such failure demonstrates his helpless-
ness."88 However, the dissenters pointed out that Dorado had been
previously convicted of criminal offenses and that a presumption exists
that on those occasions he was apprised of his right to counsel upon
arraignment and at trial. Furthermore, they felt that inmates of penal
institutions are aware of their constitutional rights.89
The Court of of Appeals of New York. on the other hand, rejected
the Dorado decision. In People v. Gunner,9° the New York court held:
[T]he majority is of the opinion that the rule heretofore an-
nounced in our decision . . . [citing People v. Failla,91 People v.
Donovan,92 People v. Meyer,93 People v. Noble,94 People v.
S342 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P. 2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965). See text
accompanying notes 85-89 infra.
84 See text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
si 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P. 2d 361 (1965).
86 42 Cal. Rptr. at 179, 398 P. 2d at 371 (Emphasis added).
87 Id. at 177-78, 398 P. 2d at 369-70.
88 Id. at 178, 398 P. 2d at 370.
89 Id. at 185, 186-87, 398 P. 2d at 377, 378-79.
90 15 N.Y. 2d 226, 205 N.E. 852 (1965).
9' 14 N.Y. 2d 178, 199 N.E. 2d 366 (1964).
92 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628 (1963).
93 11 N.Y. 2d 162, 182 N.E. 2d 103 (1962).
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Waterman,9: and People v. Di Biasi9 6] should not be extended
to render inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained by law
enforcement officers from a person who, taken into custody for
questioning prior to his arraignment or indictment, is not made
aware of his privilege to remain silent and of his right to a
lawyer even where it appears that such person has become the
target of the investigation and stands in the shoes of an
accused.9
7
The effect that both decisions had upon the law of confessions can
be best illustrated by the experience of the courts in New Jersey.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which
encompasses Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, on May 20,
1965, excluded confessions obtained in cases where the defendants did
not request counsel and could not have afforded lawyers, and reversed
the convictions because the police had failed to advise the defendants
of their right to counsel and right to remain silent. 98 Moreover, the
decision appeared to have retroactive effect.
Within two weeks of this decision, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a "pastoral letter" directed to
all lower state judges and prosecutors, ordered them to ignore the
Third Circuit's ruling and follow New Jersey law which admits into
evidence a voluntary confession unless the police refused the defendant
permission to consult an attorney after he had requested one.99
The ramifications of the Chief Justice's decision are evident. If the
New Jersey Supreme Court rules against a defendant, he can secure a
writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court and have the con-
viction reversed on the basis of the Third Circuit's ruling.100 Upon
retrial, should the state, once again, introduce the confession into
evidence, the circuitry of action could continue.
As mentioned previously, the Third Circuit's opinion appeared to
have retroactive effect in that the defendants were both convicted under
the pre-1964 law, which excluded only coerced confessions. However,
when the prosecution requested a review of their decision, the court
stated that it had not, and would not determine whether the ruling had
retroactive effect. 1 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the New Jersey precedent
of defiance and elected to follow the Third Circuit ruling.10 2
On November 22, 1965 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the police before questioning an accused are not required to
949 N.Y. 2d 571, 175 N.E. 2d 451 (1961).
95 9 N.Y. 2d 561, 175 N.E. 2d 445 (1961).
967 N.Y. 2d 544, 166 N.E. 2d 825 (1960).
97 15 N.Y. 2d at 233, 205 N.E. 2d at 855-56.
93 United States ex. rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F. 2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
99 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1965, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 29, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
100 See text at notes 167-177 infra.
201 N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1965, §1, p. 129, col. 1.
102 Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A. 2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
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apprise him of his right to counsel and right to remain silent.1"3 This
decision has been referred to as "a tragedy of errors,"', 4 in that a
person convicted of a crime, who confessed without being warned of
his constitutional rights, could have won a reversal if he had been
convicted in Delaware, New Jersey, or Pennsylvania.
While the application of the Bodie'015 decision would seem to avoid
retroactive effects of a Supreme Court adoption of the Dorado'0 6
theory, a new problem emerges. In view of those decisions which re-
quire the court to advise a defendant of his right to assigned counsel,'1 7
does this mandate the same duty upon police officers in order to have
an intelligent waiver of a known right which would render voluntary
"no counsel" confessions admissible?
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in March devoted to five
cases that raise questions in the confession field that have split the lower
courts since Escobedo:
(1) Absent a request by an accused to consult with a lawyer,
must the police inform him of his right to counsel and his right
to remain silent?
(2) In the case of an indigent, must an attorney be supplied
by the state?
(3) Must Escobedo be given retroactive effect?
(4) Is a confession obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights merely because there has been an unreason-
able delay between arrest and arraignment ?108
Where all this has led has been commented upon by one writer:
Thus, the Supreme Court which moved purposefully from the
"involuntary" rule to the "no counsel" rule to escape case by
case determination of voluntariness, may move back to the "in-
voluntary" rule, but apply the stricter standard . . of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 10 9
Clearly the morass of decisions indicates the Supreme Court must
amplify the meaning of Escobedo and set forth rules that will require
uniform procedure in all the states and guarantee "equal rights" to all
defendants of these constitutional safeguards.
DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT-EFFECT UPON CONFESSIONS
Both federal and state law prohibit delay in arraignment by statute.1 0
In a federal prosecution, a delay in arraignment absolutely excludes
from evidence a confession extracted during this period even if a court
103 United States v. Cone, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2293 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 1965) ; United
States v. Robinson, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2294 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 1965).
104 N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 23, 1965, p. 25, col. 6.
105 People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y. 2d 275, 213 N.E. 2d 411 (1965).
106 See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
107 People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y. 2d 392, 207 N.E. 2d 358 (1965).
108 N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1965, §4, p. 6E, col. 1; Time, April 29, 1966, p. 58.
109 Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions, A Legal Perspec-
tive-A Practical Perspective, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1965, p. 4, col. 7.
110FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(a). New York, e.g., has also enacted such a statute. See
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §165 and N.Y. PENAL LAW §1844.
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and jury find the confession to be wholly voluntary. This so-called
McNabb"' rule was formulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States to check "resort to those reprehensible practices known as the
'third degree' which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still
find their way into use."' 12 The rule was clarified subsequently in
Mallory v. United States :"3
The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign "without
unnecessary delay" indicates that the command does not call for
mechanical or automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a
brief delay between arrest and arraignment, as for instance,
where the story volunteered by the accused is susceptible of quick
verification through third parties. But the delay must not be of
a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession.1 4
It should be noted that a confession is not excluded from evidence
merely because there was a delay in arraignment after the confession
was made." 5
Since the Supreme Court declined to apply the McNabb-Mallory
rule to state cases,' 6 the states were permitted to adopt or reject the
"absolute rule." New York, for instance, clearly rejected it in People v.
Lane,"1 by allowing the issue of voluntariness of the confession to be
submitted to the jury even though there was a delay in arraignment in
violation of New York statutory provisions." 8 Previously the New
York court had stated that "illegal delay is but one circumstance to be
considered along with any other evidence bearing on the question of
the voluntary character of the admissions."" 09 This same view was
reiterated in a case decided in 1965.120
Absent a working arrangement between state and federal officers,
when an accused is detained without proper arraignment by state
officers, a confession obtained by federal officers during this period is
admissible in a federal prosecution.' 2' The rule is otherwise when the
federal officers are working under a pre-existing arrangement with the
local authorities.
2 2
111 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).112 Id. at 344.
113 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
114 Id. at 455.
115 See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
116 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
"17 10 N.Y. 2d 347, 179 N.E. 2d 339 (1961). Judge Fuld, concurring, argued that
the "absolute" rule of McNabb-Mallory be adopted. Id. at 354-57, 179 N.E. 2d
341-42. See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186-88 (1953).
11s See text at and accompanying note 110 supra.
"9 People v. Vargas, 7 N.Y. 2d 555, 565-66, 166 N.E. 2d 831, 837 (1960). (Em-
phasis added.)
120 People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y. 2d 360, 364, 206 N.E. 2d 864, 866 (1965) : "It
was ...error for the trial court to have refused to charge the jury that,
where appellant had been confined for 34 hours before arraignment, unwar-
ranted delay should be considered by the jury in determining whether such
confession or admission was voluntarily obtained."
121 Coppola v. United States, 365 U.S. 762 (1961).
122 Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 356 (1943) : "There was a working
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CONFESSIONS AND THE FRUIT OF THE POISON TREE DOCTRINE
Generally, evidence obtained during an unlawful search is inad-
missible at trial against the victim of the unlawful police search.
123
This same rule obtains to "the fruit of the poisonous tree."12 4 In Wong
Sun v. United States,121 the Supreme Court while reaffirming the "in-
dependent source doctrine" formulated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,"0 extended the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to
voluntary verbal statements obtained as a result of unlawful law en-
forcement activity:
Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an
unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action
in the present case is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.
27
The precise effect that Wong Sun has upon the confession cases
is still unclear. Naturally, it is one factor considered in the "totality of
circumstances" mentioned earlier."" One writer noted that, although "an
unlawful arrest is regarded as a small circumstance in the totality of
circumstances test, if accompanied by a trespass or unlawful intrusion
into the home of the accused, it may very well require exclusion as an
absolute rule under the Fourth Amendment.""' 9
Since Wong Sun was a search and seizure case, absent the distinc-
tion between tangible evidence and verbal statements,"' then statements
voluntarily rendered are not exempt from attack on constitutional
grounds if they are procured as a result of an illegal search.
Whether the state courts are bound to exclude confessions which
are the "fruit" of an unlawful arrest is not entirely clear. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that "Wong Sun's exclusionary
rule is equally applicable in both state and federal courts;"31 Maryland
arrangement between the federal officers and the sheriff . . . which made
possible the abuses revealed by this record. Therefore, the fact that the
federal officers themselves were not formally guilty of illegal conduct does
not affect the admissibility of the evidence which they secured improperly
through collaboration with state officers."
'123 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
124 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
15371 U.S. 471 (1963).
16 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920): "The essence of a provision forbidding the ac-
quisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so ac-
quired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and
inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Gov-
ernment's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
12 371 U.S. at 485.
128 See text at and accompanying note 10 supra.
129 Sobel, supra note 109, Nov. 16, 1965, p. 4, col. 6. (Emphasis in original.)
13o 371 U.S. at 485.
131 Collins v. Betto, 348 F. 2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1965).
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stated otherwise. 132 California has held the test enunciated in Wong
Sun "relating to evidence excludable as the product of an illegal search
and seizure applies to the states."'133 Although this issue has not been
finally decided by the Supreme Court, the interpretation of the Fifth
Circuit and California was intimated by the high court in Traub v.
Connecticut 34 and Fahy v. Connecticut.'35 In light of Mapp v. Ohio,3 6
consistency would compel the Supreme Court to hold that confessions
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure are inadmissible.
REDACTING OF CONFESSIONS
Defendant A is tried jointly with defendants B and C whose con-
fessions implicate A. At the trial the confessions of B and C are
admitted in evidence over the objections of counsel for B and C that
the confessions were coerced. It is unclear whether a judgment con-
victing A is subject to reversal because the confessions were improperly
admitted as against B and C.237
In Anderson v. United States,'13 the trial judge allowed in evidence
certain confessions against all petitioners, including the two noncon-
fessing defendants. Even though the confessions were admitted without
mention of the two defendants implicated and the trial judge appeared
to limit their use against those who made them, his charge did not bind
the jury to restrict the use of the confessions. The names were revealed
during the course of cross-examination of the confessing parties.
The Supreme Court stated that "there is no reason to believe .. .
that confessions which came before the jury as an organic tissue of
proof can be severed and given distributive significance by holding that
they had a major share in the conviction of some of the petitioners and
none at all as to the others."'139 Therefore, the improper acceptance of
confessions as to some of the petitioners at a federal trial was held to
necessitate a reversal as to all.
However, in a subsequent case 40 involving a state conviction the
Supreme Court, while reversing a judgment of conviction as to one de-
fendant on the ground that the confession which was the basis of the
132Medford v. State, 201 A. 2d 824, 831 (MId. 1964): "[T]his Court has held
that Wong Sun was not intended to, and does not, control prosecution in
state courts. .. ."
1 People v. Bilderbach, 44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 318, 401 P. 2d 921, 926 (1965).
134 374 U.S. 493 (1963): "The judgment is vacated and the case remanded for
further consideration in light of Wong Sion . .. , and Ker v. California (374
U.S. 23) [1963]. .. ."
1 375 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1963).
136367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1 Generally, an admission by a defendant as to his participation in a crime
is an admission against interest and therefore may be considered as evidence
by the trier of fact. However, if the confessor implicates other defendants,
as to them, the admissions are hearsay.
138 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
139Id. at 357.
140Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
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conviction was obtained in violation of due process, affirmed as to the
codefendant. The confession in issue contained instead of the names
of the defendants other than the confessing party, the letters "X" and
"Y." The jury was instructed that the confession was admitted against
the confessor alone and that they were not to speculate as to the identity
of "X" and "Y." The trial court also submitted the case against the
nonconfessor separately from the case against the confessing party.
The questions raised by the nonconfessing codefendant, stated the Court,
"involve matters of state procedure beyond our province to review. ''1 1
Similarly in Stein v. New York,'42 Wissner, a codefendant who never
confessed, was implicated by those who did. The Court found that
there was no constitutional basis to set aside the conviction "[Elven if
the confessions were considered to have been involuntary, their use
would not have violated any federal right of Wissner.1 43 Malinski v.
New York' was cited in support of this rule.'4 5
Delli Paoli v. United States' reiterated the position that the Su-
preme Court adhered to in Malinski and Stein but involved a federal
prosecution. The trial court had admitted in evidence a confession of
a codefendant which was made after the conspiracy had terminated.
The trial court instructed that the confession was to be applied only
as against the confessing defendant and not the other defendants. The
Supreme Court held that reversible error was not committed. The
petitioner took no exception to the instructions of the trial court 4 7 and
the Supreme Court concluded that it "may also proceed on the basis
that the jury followed these instructions. . . . It is a basic premise of
our jury system that the court states the law to the jury and that the
jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds them.' 148 However,
the Court pointed out that there could be "practical limitations to the
circumstances under which a jury should be left to follow instruc-
tio n s . . . . ,,:49
In a recent New York case, 5 ' the Court of Appeals was confronted
with a situation in which a confession of A was read in evidence
141 Id. at 412.
142346 U.S. 156 (1953).
143346 U.S. at 194.
144324 U.S. 401 (1945).
145 346 U.S. at 194.146352 U.S. 232 (1957).
14 ld. at 239-40:
When the confession was admitted in evidence, the trial court said:
"The proof of the Government has now been completed except
for the testimony of the witness Greenberg as to the alleged state-
ment or affidavit of the defendant Whitley. This affidavit or admis-
sion will be considered by you solely in connection with your de-
termination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant Whitley. It
is not to be considered as proof in connection with the guilt or in-
nocence of any of the other defendants."
'4 Id. at 241, 242. Cf. text accompanying note 139 supra.
149352 U.S. at 243.15o People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y. 2d 360, 206 N.E. 2d 864 (1965).
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over the objection of counsel for U, the confession implicating U.
Counsel also requested that any statements which implicated appellant
U be deleted. Notwithstanding such requests, A's entire confession
was admitted. In pointing out the difficulty with such confessions, the
court stated:
Where it is not possible to segregate the implication of a
codefendant in a confession, for the reason that the admission
of guilt is so interrelated in the involvement of the accomplice
as to render it impossible for practical purposes to separate
them, there is no alternative but to receive the confession and
then for the court to instruct the jury to consider it only as
against the one who has confessed, disregarding the implication
of anyone else in the commission of the crime. Such an instruc-
tion is not a perfect solution to the problem, inasmuch as it is
difficult to eliminate from the minds of the jurors the implica-
tion of the codefendant, but it is the best that can be done
under the circumstances. Here there was no abuse of discretion
in ordering these defendants to be tried together, but where it
is possible, as here, to separate the portions of the confession
in which the confessor admits his own guilt from his involvement
of another, it has been held that the confession should be re-
dacted by eliminating the portion implicating the codefendant ....
It was, therefore, error to admit the entire confession, over the
objection by appellant's counsel, without deleting the easily sever-
able portion which charged appellant with being an accomplice. x5'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, following California's ex-
ample,1 2 has taken a more liberal position. 1 3
In view of the following language from the Jackson v. Denno5
decision: "The obvious and serious danger is that the jury disregarded
or disbelieved Jackson's testimony pertaining to the confession because
it believed he had done precisely what he was charged with doing,"'155
and the court's reservation in Delli Paoli,1 56 the self-limiting rule of
Malinski'57 is questionable. Is there not as great a danger that a jury
1 51 15 N.Y. 2d at 363-64, 206 N.E. 2d at 865-66.
'M People v. Aranda, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P. 2d 265 (1965).
1.5 State v. Young, 215 A. 2d 352, 356 (N.J. 1965) :
When two or more defendants are indicted for the same offense and the
prosecution intends to use a confession of one defendant implicating his
codefendants, the problems relating to the proper use of that confession
should be resolved before trial. Accordingly, if the prosecutor plans to
have the defendants tried jointly, he must move, on notice to the de-
fendants, for a judicial determination of whether there can be an effective
deletion of all references to the codefendants without prejudice to the
confessing defendant. By effective deletion we mean the elimination of
not only direct and indirect identification of codefendants but of any
statements that could be damaging to the codefendants once their identity
is otherwise established .... If it appears that effective deletions are not
feasible and the State still feels that the confession must be used against
the declarant, the court should order separate trials.
154 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
155 Id. at 383.
156 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
157324 U.S. 401 (1945).
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could not disregard the confession of a codefendant which completely
implicates a nonconfessing defendant as there is that they could not
disregard an involuntary confession? If so, due process should dictate
separate trials.
THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARINESS-PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
Prior to Jackson v. Denno,158 three rules were generally applied in
determining the admissibility of confessions. The former New York
rule left to the jury the question of voluntariness, if a factual conflict
existed as to voluntariness. Under the "orthodox rule," the judge, after
hearing all the evidence, rules on the voluntariness for the purpose of
admissibility. The jury then considers the voluntariness as a factor in
determining the weight and the credibility of the confession. Finally,
the Massachusetts or "humane rule" allows the-judge, before allowing
the confession into evidence, to hear all the evidence and rule on the
voluntariness. Only if he finds the confession to be voluntary, is the
jury permitted to receive the confession and instructed that it must
find the confession voluntary before it may consider it.
In Jackson v. Denno'19 the Supreme Court in reversing a judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denying the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus stated:
In our view, the New York procedure employed in this case did
not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the
confession offered in evidence at the trial, did not adequately
protect Jackson's right to be free of a conviction based upon a
coerced confession and therefore cannot withstand constitutional
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
160
The reasons for its decision were principally threefold: (1) Since
the jury in New York was presented with evidence bearing on volun-
tariness as well as corroborating evidence indicating that the confession
is true and that the defendant in fact committed the act charged, it may
therefore believe both the confession and that the defendant committed
the crime charged, "a circumstance which may seriously distort judg-
ment of the credibility of the accused and assessment of the testimony
concerning the critical facts surrounding his confession." 101 (2) Under
New York procedure it is difficult for the court to determine what
effect the confession had on the jury's verdict of guilty.10 2 (3) The
defendant, in order to contest the voluntariness of the confession, was
often compelled to testify in the presence of the jury and thereby
expose himself to impeachment.
163
158378 U.S. 368 (1964).
159 Ibid.
160 378 U.S. at 377.
161 Id. at 381.
162 Id. at 379-80.
1631d. at 389 n. 16.
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The Court in rejecting the New York procedure left to the states
to allocate the judge-jury functions, and the courts are free to adopt
the Massachusetts6 4 or the orthodox rule.
The disruptive effect of the decision was pointed out by Mr. Justice
Black who dissented in part and concurred in part:
Today's holding means that hundreds of prisoners in the State
of New York have been convicted after the kind of trial which
the Court now says is unconstitutional .. . The disruptive effect
which today's decision will have on the administration of criminal
justice throughout the country will undoubtedly be great. Before
today's holding is even a day old the Court has relied on it to
vacate convictions in 11 cases. .... 1,5
This effect is furthered by the current-day practice of appealing
state court decisions through the federal courts. 166 Chief Judge Desmond
of the Court of Appeals of New York has pointed out the problems
encountered as a result of federal habeas corpus proceedings which
permit a defendant to appeal through the federal system even after he
"appeals through the state system, petitions the Supreme Court for
certiorari, takes coram nobis proceedings through the state courts with
subsequent application for Supreme Court certiorari. .. -167 He cites,
as an example of the type of results that can be expected under the
present procedure, the histories of Caminito, Bonivo and Noia who were
convicted in 1942 in state courts and finally obtained relief through
federal habeas corpus by 1963:
Summing up the facts: three men confessed to a killing, a
state court jury refused to credit their claims that their con-
fessions were forced ones, one defendant for his own reasons
took no appeal at all, but the appeals of the other two taken on
the same ground of illegally obtained confessions were rejected
by the two appellate courts of the state, and as to one defendant
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Yet years later in the
federal courts all three defendants obtained relief on the same
old charge of coerced confessions, and all of them went free.'6
A similar pattern of appeals was presented in Jackson v. Denno:
after Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of
Appeals'69 the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 7 0 He then filed a
164 See id. at 378 n.8.
165 Id. at 406.
166 See Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review
of Sentences in the United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963).
167Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How to Make Two Parallel
Judicial Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A.J. 1166, 1167 (1963).
168 Id. at 1166-67 at nn.l-4.
169 People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y. 2d 780, 177 N.E. 2d 59 (1961). The remittur of
the Court of Appeals was amended to indicate that after passing on the
voluntariness of Jackson's confession, the court determined that his con-
stitutional rights were not violated. 10 N.Y. 2d 816, 178 N.E. 2d 234 (1961).170Jackson v. New York, 368 U.S. 949 (1961).
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petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court.171 The denial
of this petition was affirmed by the court of appeals. 1 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari173 and finally the judgment denying Jackson's
writ of habeas corpus was reversed and the case was remanded to the
federal district court to allow the State of New York a reasonable time
to afford the petitioner a hearing on the issue of voluntariness or a new
trial, failing which he was held to be entitled to his release. 4
The relief that was granted was further questionable in that "New
York's procedure was not invoked in the trial court or attacked on
appeal' 75 and was therefore not properly before the Supreme Court.
"The New York procedure providing for a preliminary hearing could
be set in motion, and its validity questioned, only if objection was made
to the admissibility of the confession. It is clear, further noted the
dissent, "that counsel for petitioner in the trial court . . . did not object
to the introduction of the statements made by the petitioner or ask for
a preliminary hearing."
' 1 76
What all this amounts to, in the words of Chief Judge Desmond, is
that "unless some accommodation and adjustment can be worked out,
much confusion, much delay and, most regrettably, a great increase in
the business of already sadly overburdened courts"' 77 will result.
A related procedural problem arises from coram nobis petitions in
which prisoners seek to extend the implications of recent Supreme
Court rulings. The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that after
a plea of guilty entered with the aid of counsel, the validity of a con-
fession cannot be raised regardless of whether the petitioner alleges
it was coerced and/or taken in the absence of counsel. 7 8 This ruling
will have to be passed on eventually by the Supreme Court, since the
basic argument is that, but for this confession obtained by unconstitu-
tional methods, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty.
CONCLUSION
One area not discussed is the extent to which the press, radio and
television are entitled to report on a criminal case. As a result of the
report of the Warren Commission 1 79 and the Supreme Court decision
in Estes v. Texas,"" a number of bar organizations, judges and others
have proposed or adopted specific restrictions' 8 ' on reporting of such
17' Application of Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
172 United States ex reL. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F. 2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
173371 U.S. 967 (1963).
174 378 U.S. at 396.
175 Id. at 423 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark).
176 Ibid.
177 Desmond, supra note 167, at 1167.
178 People v. Griffin, 16 N.Y. 2d 508, 208 N.E. 2d 179 (1965) (mem.).
179 Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy (1964).
180381 U.S. 532 (1965).




cases. In light of the confusion existing in the area of confessions, it
is of no surprise that statements in reference to confessions or in-
criminating admissions were singled out as examples of what should
not be reported, at least in advance of their admission on trial.
Of further noteworthy interest is Curry v. United States'1 2 wherein
the Second Circuit in a unanimous decision stated:
"'If the defendant offers testimony contrary to the facts disclosed by
evidence which has been suppressed, the Government may in the in-
terest of truth use this illegally obtained evidence to establish facts
collateral to the ultimate issue of guilt." 8 3
Here statements which were given by Curry in the absence of counsel
and during a period of unnecessary delay prior to arraignment consti-
tuted the illegally obtained evidence which was ordered suppressed.
The court warned that "the Government cannot use the fruits of illegal
activities to establish the elements of the crime with which the defendant
is charged,"'1 4 but it can use such evidence to establish facts collateral
to the issue of guilt.
Public opinion is slowly being moulded on the question of whether
the pendulum has swung so far in an endeavor to protect the individual
that the rights of the public have been dealt a crippling blow. Seminars
for law enforcement officers, magistrates and others involved in the
law enforcement process are not uncommon,'8 5 and the "confession
confusion" provokes considerable discussion which those charged with
the duty of deciding case might wish to hear if they are interested in
"grass-roots" sentiment. 
-
Law enforcement officials, prosecuting and defense attorneys and
the judiciary, not to mention the crime conscious public, eagerly await
Supreme Court decisions which will hopefully reduce if not eliminate
the confession confusion. It is fervently hoped that out of this re-
examination and updating of the criminal law and the establishment of
clear guidelines will develop a respect for both the law and those
charged with its enforcement.
1s2--F. 2d-" (2d Cir. 1965).
183 Id. at -.
184 Id. at -.
185 A seminar on community safety principally for invited law enforcement
officers and magistrates was initially conducted at University College of
Syracuse Uniersity in the Spring of 1965. This was repeated in the Fall and
is again scheduled for the Spring of 1966. Many other universities have con-
ducted seminars or symposiums treating the impact of Supreme Court de-
cisions on local law enforcement practices. The editorial pages of news-
papers and magazines have carried commentaries on this general subject.
As a result, many communities are becoming aware of current developments
and are voicing their sentiments on these crucial problems.
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